1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
3	RICHARD L. ARMSTRONG,
4	Plaintiff,
5	CIVIL ACTION NO.
6	1:19CV173
7	and
8	DONALD R. REYNOLDS,
9	Plaintiff,
10	CIVIL ACTION NO.
11	1:19CV174
12	Vs.
13	ANTERO RESOURCES CORPORATION,
14	Defendant.
15	
16	Proceedings had in the TELEPHONIC SCHEDULING CONFERENCE of
17	the above-styled action on December 11, 2019, before the
18	HONORABLE IRENE M. KEELEY, SENIOR JUDGE, at Clarksburg, West
19	Virginia.
20	
21	<u>APPEARANCES:</u>
22	On Behalf of the Plaintiffs:
23	WILLIAM E. FORD, III Ford Law Office
24	217 East Main Street Clarksburg, West Virginia 26301
25	
	Stacy Harlow, RVR-M, CVR-M, CM, RCP, RBC P.O. Box 969 Clarksburg, West Virginia 26301 304.623.7154

1	APPEARANCES (CONTINUED):
2	On Behalf of the Defendant.
3	JUSTIN RUBENSTEIN SHANIA MASSIE
4	W. HENRY LAWRENCE Steptoe & Johnson, PLLC
5	400 White Oaks Boulevard Bridgeport, West Virginia 26330
6	Proceedings recorded utilizing realtime translation.
7	Transcript produced by computer-aided transcription.
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	Ctacy Harlow DVP-M CVP-M CM DCD DRC

PROCEEDINGS 1 2 (Wednesday, December 11, 2019, at 2:31 P.M.) 3 THE COURT: Good afternoon. This is Judge Keeley, and this is the scheduling conference in Armstrong versus 4 5 Antero Resources, Corp., 1:19CV173, and Reynolds versus Antero Resources, Corp., 1:19CV174. 6 Could counsel, beginning with plaintiffs' counsel, note 7 8 their appearance, please. MR. FORD: William Ford, representing both 9 10 plaintiffs, in both cases. 11 THE COURT: Thank you. 12 MR. RUBENSTEIN: Justin Rubenstein, and also on the 13 line are Hank Lawrence and Shania Massie, for Antero Resources 14 Corporation. 15 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Good afternoon to all counsel. This case has pending motions -- these cases, I 16 17 should say, have pending motions to dismiss. And I'd like to 18 take those up. I'm assuming both sides are ready to address 19 the issues. 20 MR. RUBENSTEIN: Yes, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: Mr. Ford. 22 MR. FORD: Yes, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. All right. Now, the 24 case is here under 28, U.S.C., 1332, diversity jurisdiction. 25 The amount in controversy exceeds \$75,000. Antero is moving to Stacy Harlow, RVR-M, CVR-M, CM, RCP, RBC P.O. Box 969 Clarksburg, West Virginia 26301 304.623.7154

dismiss in both cases based on failure to state a claim, and plaintiffs have opposed the motion and argue that each and every representation has no basis in either law or fact. But I think their arguments that have been raised are more colorable than that, Mr. Ford, and we need to take them up.

Now, I am looking at the first allegation of failure to plead a complete contract. And, Mr. Ford, Antero is contending that the plaintiffs have failed to state a plausible claim for relief because they have not alleged a complete contract. That is based on the fact that the complaints attach the 1913 Freeman Lease, and the 1925 Lease Modification. There—you have not, on their behalf, attached three subsequent modifications, which would include the 1926 Modification, the 1936 Doak Modification, and the 2015 Armstrong Modification, and the 2014 Reynolds Modification. And the argument is that without them, Antero believes that I cannot determine whether the plaintiffs have a breach of operative provisions claim, which they can pursue pursuant to the 1913 Freeman Lease and the 1925 Lease Modification, because they're contending that the leases were amended by the subsequent modifications.

What's your response to that?

MR. FORD: Well, Your Honor, the two modifications -the modification in the assignment chain after the two Freeman
-- the Freeman Lease, and the original Freeman Lease
Modification after that, I do believe were modifications that

did not affect the language or the requirement of the -modification -- the first two signed by Joseph Freeman, who was
the owner of a hundred percent of the oil and gas rights at the
time that these two modifications were executed.

Other modifications that they've referenced are just in between the two transferees of the assignment assignee, the ultimate assignee of the contract right.

Now, I will -- I can say, Judge, that I attached, as part of -- and alleged as part of the contract, the alleged modification. I also attached the Memorandum of Modification for -- that Mr. Armstrong signed, because we have not been able to locate the original signed modification agreement that Antero referenced. Antero did not, certainly, allege those documents in their motion, but they do exist. I was counting on discovery to get a copy of Mr. Armstrong's original modification, as opposed to the memo, Memorandum of Modification that's recorded.

So, Your Honor, I think, in all respect, I have alleged the contract appropriately. And, certainly, we have alleged the pertinent provisions that none of the modifications, I believe, affect. Mr. Reynolds' modification would not -- I do not believe would change any of the terms of the original Freeman Lease, and the Freeman Modification, except insofar as those specific items that are mentioned in that Modification of Oil and Gas Lease. And, in fact, in my

complaint, I allege the language in the Antero Modification of Oil and Gas Lease that the -- in that document, the lessor ratified and confirmed the leases that are referenced. And the lease that is referenced is the original Joseph Freeman Lease. I believe we have well pled our contract action petition, you know, to get by this motion to dismiss.

Certainly, if there is more particular language that it looks like I would need to include in the complaint language, I would eventually ask the Court for leave to amend that complaint. But I'm not sure we have that situation here, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

What's Antero's response to that?

MR. RUBENSTEIN: First off, Your Honor, the full modifications were attached to Antero's respective motions to dismiss. So Mr. Ford should have those now, if he didn't before.

And, secondly, as to the point that the 2014, 2015 modifications ratified the lease, that's true, but it ratified the lease, as amended.

And to the substance, Your Honor, the 2014 and 2015 modifications go directly to the point of Mr. Ford's complaint. And to split it up, there's royalties, and then there's the audit provision, I think, is really what we're talking about. And without doubt, the royalties provision was modified in both

the Reynolds and the Armstrong modifications. The Armstrong modification contains a further audit provision that expressly changes any audit terms that are present in the 1925 Modification, upon which Mr. Ford relied.

We would argue further that even the Reynolds, although it doesn't contain the express audit clause, that the 1925 modification, where it talks about the ability to inspect records, is really tied into the royalty clause. So where the 2014 Reynolds modification modified that royalties clause, it superseded the entire clause, it superseded the language of that royalties clause and introduced a new royalties clause.

THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Ford, at bottom, you're seeking relief in this case for, among other reasons, that Antero hasn't paid your clients their royalties within 60 days, which is one of the provisions in the original lease, correct?

MR. FORD: Your Honor, we have corresponded on these issues prior to filing suit. At the time -- certainly, we demanded royalty payments, because they have been producing for a year or so without paying any royalty payments.

So when we filed the complaint, they had not paid any royalty payments. Within 30 days of filing the complaint, Antero did, it appears, pay the royalties that were owed to my clients on those wells.

So -- so -- I -- I mean, I've already expressed

that in our response to the motion to dismiss, that we do not appear to have a significant claim for damages. We might have a claim for some interest. But, Judge, I can't imagine that being anywhere near \$75,000.

This case is about specific performance of those audit provisions in that Freeman Lease. I've -- out of all the many, many leaseholds I've analyzed over the last 10 years, and the first 5 years of my career, this is probably the first one where I have seen that kind of significant audit language. And all of the royalty -- and my clients, they -- they get paid on a lot of other wells that Antero is producing, and we have great question as to how they set that price per MCF number that is reflected on those royalty statements, and from which the calculations for production that match with the West Virginia DEP record, with Antero -- provides to the DEP. But that's where the golden number comes and makes -- turns into royalty that are part of that royalty check.

One other note, Your Honor, Antero did not include -they only include Mr. Armstrong's -- no, they did not include
Mr. Armstrong's modification or the lease, that I saw.

THE COURT: All right.

Let me remind everyone that when a case is removed, the Court looks at its basis for jurisdiction as -- in the snapshot of the time when the case was removed. So to tell me that subsequently there's been a royalty payment and that we're

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really, now, only here on the audit, and you don't think this
case is worth $75,000, that is an argument that comes in a very
untimely way, and doesn't have any legs here with respect, Mr.
Ford. I've got to look at this at the time that the case was
removed, and what the allegations were in the complaint then.
          So let me just start through this.
          MR. FORD: Judge -- Judge, if I may.
          THE COURT: Go ahead.
          MR. FORD: I -- we need to do the calculation of the
royalty that they paid on those wells, because even that number
may not reach $75,000. I have to admit, I wasn't -- I thought
the Court would be looking at the jurisdictional amount in
controversy today, as well. I apologize for missing that.
          THE COURT: Well, yeah, you didn't raise it, Mr.
      So, again, I think this is too late to raise it. And,
Ford.
by the way, did you move to remand?
         MR. FORD: Well -- well...
          THE COURT: No. No. The answer is --
         MR. FORD: No, Your Honor, I --
          THE COURT: And you've got a --
         MR. FORD: -- did --
          THE COURT: -- time constraint on that, Mr. --
                    Okay. I did raise the diversity amount
          MR. FORD:
issue in my response to the motion to dismiss.
           Stacy Harlow, RVR-M, CVR-M, CM, RCP, RBC
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P.O. Box 969 Clarksburg, West Virginia

THE COURT: Did you move to remand?

MR. FORD: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. It's too late to do that now, unless it becomes obvious, at some point, that the Court has lost jurisdiction, and then that would trigger your right to move to remand.

But let me go through this, Mr. Ford. I mean, you may have a bit of buyers remorse about being in federal court now, but, you know, you've got -- you're going to deal with that, at least through this early stage of it.

The failure to complete -- to plead a complete contract is a colorable argument here, but it's not going to result in a dismissal of your case. It's going to result in your need to amend your complaint in order to plead the subsequent modifications to the leases. This is not a new principle of law. It's one that's been around for a long time, and it's one that this Court has previously spoken to.

You don't mention or discuss or attach the subsequent modifications to the two leases. And I know you contend that these modifications have no effect on the royalty payment and document inspection provisions of the 1913 Freeman Lease and the 1925 Lease Modification, but that is for me to decide, isn't it, based on the motion that was filed by the defendant. And I can't decide it based on what's in front of me.

So my ruling on this is, you have failed to allege a

complete contract because of the failure to mention the subsequent modifications. But I'm going to grant you leave to amend your complaints, and I deny Antero's motion to dismiss on this basis.

I will make a decision on your legal argument once I have all the facts in front of me. And I don't think it's a discovery issue, as you argued earlier. It's a pleading issue, and you're going to have to go back and fix that complaint.

And I know we're coming up on the holidays here, so I don't sense any urgency on either side's part to get this done within the next 10 days. And I will give you until the end of the first week in January, or sooner, to get that amended complaint filed on each of -- on behalf of each of your clients. That would be Friday, January 10th. All right?

MR. FORD: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Now, the second --

MR. FORD: I'm happy to do that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: The second issue is the timing of the payments and right to inspect documents. And Antero contends that they have -- you contend that the lease modifications don't modify or supersede the -- either the timing requirement for the payment of the royalties, or the opportunity to review the documentation concerning Antero's royalty. But Antero contends that there is an audit clause, which in the 2015 Armstrong Modification and 2014 Reynolds Modification that does

modify the earlier provisions and provides a much more limited right, which is to an annual audit.

I know the plaintiffs are contending that although they've been paid royalty payments now, they can still maintain a breach of contract cause of action for the untimeliness of the payments, and the failure to comply with their document requests because, again, you don't -- you contend the subsequent modifications haven't modified or eliminated the pertinent provisions of the original 1913 primary lease, and the 1926 modification of that lease.

The argument -- if I've missed any of your argument, I'm happy to hear from you further on that, Mr. Ford, if you wish.

MR. FORD: Oh, absolutely, Your Honor. You're talking about addressing it in amended pleadings, correct?

I'm saying is, what I have in front of me right now is, again, the argument by Antero, oh, no, wait a minute, Judge. There's a big modification here, and it's material because it changes the earlier opportunity that your clients might have had under the original lease to obtain royalty calculations, other than by an annual audit. And now it is solely, according to Antero, by an annual audit.

Am I correct about that, Mr. Rubenstein?

MR. RUBENSTEIN: Yes, Your Honor. And that's

specific to Armstrong. And to give the Court a little bit of flavor of what's been going on here, Antero has paid the royalties for all the wells, has paid interest for late payments under the West Virginia statute 37C-1-3.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. RUBENSTEIN: Has engaged with Mr. Ford in an attempt to satisfy his clients' demand for documents. And we seem to be hung up a little bit on that. But that's -- you've explained the argument well, Your Honor. And that is a very limited audit right. And the contention is Mr. Ford's clients have not complied with the provisions of that audit right.

Nonetheless, we have offered to try to resolve this.

And we tried to offer a protective order. We haven't been able to come to an agreement on that either, Your Honor. But I think you hit the nail on the head in describing it. It's a limited audit right, and contention -- Antero's contention is Mr. Ford's clients did not comply with it.

THE COURT: All right. The Armstrong Modification, and I think the 2014 Reynolds Modification, adopted, ratified, and confirmed the 1913 Freeman Lease, significantly, quote, "as amended." And that language is specifically, "For the same consideration recited above, each of the undersigned does hereby adopt, ratify, and confirm the lease, as amended."

And my understanding from what's been argued here, Mr. Ford, is that that confirms the subsequent modifications

did modify the payment provision of the 1913 Freeman Lease and the document-inspection provision of the 1925 Lease Modification.

What -- how do you argue -- I mean, I'm not going to -- we're at a very early stage here, and this may be a question more for summary judgment, but if it's unclear whether the 2015 Armstrong and 2014 modifications modified or superseded the payment provisions of the 1913 Freeman Lease, that's a question for development during the case, as I would see it. But, if the -- if the argument is it wasn't supported by sufficient consideration, that's to be developed at a later time. I don't think you're really denying there was a modification, are you?

MR. FORD: Oh, Your Honor, we are not denying the modification. What we are saying -- what I'll be arguing is that if Antero had -- a lease modification -- and when you read the ratification paragraph at the bottom, they clearly state that they are -- they are assuming all responsibilities, liabilities, obligations of those original lease documents. And I would think that if Antero was going to modify or change those specific lease provisions, then they would have set that out specifically in the modification. That this modification paragraph supersedes, in all respect, the audit paragraph of the 1926 Lease. That's our primary point, Your Honor.

Your Honor, I did not realize we would be in federal court, because I did not think we had the damages that would

ever keep us there. So I will apologize for not pulling out all those other lease modifications through the assignee type. We will correct that now that we are going to be in federal court before you, and, certainly, if -- you know, I certainly believe we can set forth a very viable cause of action on these audit rights that the Freeman leaseholders have.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I'm going to let you amended the complaint, and in that amended complaint, surely you will address that even though the Reynolds modifications do not include a timing provision, that doesn't necessarily mean that they conflict with the timing provision of the 1913 Freeman Lease. I mean, it could be that all of this could be plausibly read together to require royalty payments, as set forth in the 2015 and 2014 modifications, under the timing set forth in the 1913 Freeman Lease modification.

But then you have this other claim about the breach of contract claims based on document inspection requests, and how that states a plausible claim for relief is uncertain to me, because unlike the payment provisions, the document inspection provisions cannot be plausibly read together. The 1925 Lease Modification provides a general right to inspect documents at the lessor's request. But the 2015 and '14 modifications limit this right to an annual right to inspect, which has to be triggered by a notice of audit, which must be sent by certified mail.

1 So, I mean, I don't really see an argument there, Mr. 2 Ford, as to any ambiguity or lack of plain meaning when it 3 comes to the modification regarding document inspection, when they may be inspected, and where they may be inspected. All of 4 5 that is set out, isn't it? MR. FORD: I think the difference is, is -- is that 6 7 -- these primary lease terms were brought about by the actual 8 owners of the oil and gas rights. And that's where our 9 clients' rights stem from. 10 THE COURT: Well, but --11 MR. FORD: I think there were --12 THE COURT: But there were --MR. FORD: Your Honor, I'm going to have to go back 13 14 and analyze this. 15 THE COURT: Okay. 16 MR. FORD: Closely. 17 THE COURT: All right. You don't -- just so you 18 know, I don't think you allege that your clients sent Antero an 19 annual notice of audit by certified mail, or that Antero failed 20 to comply with that notice. 21 So, if -- you know, when you're re-pleading in your amended complaint, you're going to want to look carefully as to 22 23 whether you can state a possible breach of contract claim based 24 on what appears to be a clear limited right of inspection. 25 if you're going to argue that I'm -- that that's wrong, you're Stacy Harlow, RVR-M, CVR-M, CM, RCP, RBC P.O. Box 969 Clarksburg, West Virginia 26301

certainly going to have to include all the documents so that, as a Court, I can take a look at all of it and determine exactly what the contract is. You can't just come in here and say, well, we didn't attach any of that because we don't think it matters. It's got to be something that's going to be before the Court. And I think that would be true whether you're in state court or federal court.

So let me say that with regard to where we are so far, I'm going to grant in part and deny in part Antero's motions to dismiss the plaintiffs' breach of contract claims. I'm going to limit the claims to the timing of the royalty payments, with the opportunity to amend the complaints to allege a complete contract. All right? So this is all without prejudice.

Now, let's look at West Virginia Code 37C-1-3, because Antero is contending that the plaintiffs cannot state an independent cause of action under that statute because that statute only provides a right to interest for untimely payments. It does not create an independent cause of action.

I think that's a correct statement of the law, but before I make a final ruling on that, Mr. Ford, did I hear you state that your clients have been paid their interest?

MR. FORD: I believe they have. We just haven't -it's so difficult to do the calculations from the information
that we have, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Let me say this -MR. FORD: But it does appear --

THE COURT: All right. Let me say -- if I can say this: I would say that if you can do that calculation within the next 30 or so days and find out whether you still have a claim under that -- whether you think you have a claim under that statute, because what I'm going to tell you is, you can't file it that way.

The -- there is, I think, a very clear difference between a statute that is silent about creating a separate cause of action, and a statute that clearly recognizes and intends to create a cause of action. And we've got just that kind of language in Section 37C of the code. So we know that the legislature knows how to create an independent cause of action to enforce an oil and gas company's statutory obligations. It didn't do that in 37C-1-3. But it do that in 37C-1-1(b).

So I -- my ruling, as of what I've got in front of me today, is, West Virginia law does not permit an independent cause of action under 37C-1-3. So to the extent that you're alleging that, rather than filing a request for certain damages in conjunction with your breach of contract claim, I'm going to grant Antero's motions to dismiss that particular claim in each of the cases.

I'm not saying you can't get damages; I'm just saying

you can't file that as a separate cause of -- independent cause of action. Big difference. Okay?

MR. FORD: I understand, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FORD: It's not a problem for us.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. And then, finally, the duty of good faith and fair dealing, which Antero seeks to dismiss is, again, I think, well taken as an argument here, or because West Virginia does not recognize a stand-alone claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. That's, I think, part of your breach of contract claim. And I grant Antero's motion to dismiss that independent claim for breach of the duty.

And with regard to the fiduciary duty of a lessor, here again, I and other courts in this state, have concluded that a fiduciary duty does not exist between the parties of an oil and gas lease. The duty created by the lease is one of ordinary prudence, and not of a fiduciary. So I will also grant the motion to dismiss that claim.

So what you've got is, you've got your case for breach of contract. You've got to amend your complaint. And I've dismissed, with prejudice, the independent claim under the statute for breach of contract for inspection of documents and statutory damages, and the breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and the breach of the fiduciary duty. But you

have 30 days to amend your complaints to allege a complete contract, and to assert any related request for damages. I also deny your motion to strike.

I'm not going to schedule the case today. Candidly, it sounds to me like with the time you have, maybe an early mediation would be in order. Because your -- it sounds like you may be halfway there, Mr. Ford. Your clients are getting their royalties, and maybe have received their interest payments. And it doesn't sound like Antero is refusing to provide an audit, or allow you to have an audit, the annual audit, but you haven't asked for it the right way.

Mr. Rubenstein, I don't want to overstate what I understand from Antero, but I didn't hear you say Antero would violate its legal duty under the statute or under the contract to provide an audit.

MR. RUBENSTEIN: You stated our position correctly, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Is Antero amenable to discussing this matter with Mr. Ford?

MR. RUBENSTEIN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. It sounds like Mr. Ford's clients are -- having not been paid their royalties on a timely basis have -- got a -- you've breached their level of uncertainty and discomfort, and they're not going to turn back until they get to see the numbers and make sure that they're getting what

they're supposed to get.

MR. FORD: Your Honor, that's what this case is about.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. FORD: We anticipated that they may end up, you know, paying the royalties after I filed the suit, but we never know. But, clearly, Your Honor, my clients, we want to -- we want to see the information that tells us how much Antero is getting paid for the gas and oil that they're producing from my client.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me say this: If you will get into discussions and they look like they're bearing fruit and you need some more time, but you don't want to spend it amending your complaint, you can ask for an extension of the deadline to file your amend complaint. Is that amenable to both sides?

MR. FORD: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. RUBENSTEIN: Yes, Your Honor. And, Your Honor, if I can raise one point. We've had discussions -- much of the information that Mr. Ford's clients are requesting, or would be entitled to under the audit provisions, I mean, as you can read, the audit provision provides that they're entitled to inspect -- even under the 1925 Modification, which Mr. Ford relies upon, it's a -- it's a -- it's to inspect, and it's not -- not to have copies and take those copies home with them and

give them to their neighbors. And that's one of the issues that arise as we've tried to get an agreed protective order in this case is, Mr. Ford stated that his client wanted to share the information with co-tenants in the lease. Didn't name those co-tenants. And we, obviously, don't agree with that.

So I would ask the Court maybe, if it deems appropriate, to weigh in on that. If the Court has a protective order that it typically enters in matters like this, Antero would be agreeable to that. We proposed one, but, as I said, we've not been able to an agreement on it. And that's going to be important as we discuss providing documents.

You know, if Mr Ford's clients aren't going to travel to Antero's headquarters in Denver to inspect these documents, which I don't think that they've indicated they want to do that, and they want these documents provided, then we're going to need some protective order in place.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Ford, I know you'll weigh in on this in a minute, but it does seem advisable and in your clients' interest to reach some sort of a protective order that would give your clients the inspection of documents they want, without incurring the expense of flying to Denver. And, you know, they may want to spread this around, but they don't necessarily have a right to do that. So you understand what we're saying here.

MR. FORD: Your Honor, I'll be discussing the

have access to.

protective order with counsel for Antero a little more specifically, because they're -- I don't know if you've ever been exposed to the formula that Antero has for coming up with that price per MCF that they put on the royalty statements.

THE COURT: Oh, I have. I have. Trust me, I have.

MR. FORD: It points to a lot of public information.

And I want -- I need to spend some time with counsel to

delineate where the line is over trade -- protected trade

information versus public information that thousands and

thousands and thousands of royalty owners should and ought to

THE COURT: Okay. Now, let me just say this, because it happens, that you get in a -- what looks like an ordinary case and the next thing you know, you can't reach an agreement for a protective order because your eyes are looking forward to a possible class action or something in those lines, and I just -- I will tell you, I'm going to handle this within the four corners of what I have here, Mr. Ford. And if you're looking to get their work-back formula, it's available. I know that. And they'll make it available to you, according to reasonable terms. I've seen it in other litigation.

That's what we're talking about isn't it, Mr. Rubenstein?

MR. RUBENSTEIN: I believe that's right, Your Honor. But, again, we've had several cases with Mr. Ford, and the

discovery requests can quickly become consuming and burdensome. And, so, we want to -- we want to keep things reasonable within the terms of the specific audit provisions --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. RUBENSTEIN: -- that we're talking about in this case.

THE COURT: Well, I guess, Mr. Ford, you're going to have to decide whether these two plaintiffs are stalking horses for some big -- potential class action, or whether you're going to deal straight up with me in this case and we're going to resolve it. It sounds very much like a case that can be resolved without spending a lot of your clients' time, money, your energy, and that of Antero. But if it's something more than that, you'll let me know with your amended complaint, won't you?

MR. FORD: Oh, absolutely. We're not interested in that, Your Honor. My clients have -- are getting -- they've been getting paid substantial royalty money from Antero. This is a very important issue to them alone, not just -- well, I just said that because there are lots of people in our same position.

THE COURT: Uh-huh. Okay. Well, I'll enter an order that gives you till January 10th to amend the complaint and get your claims clarified. It will also summarize the rulings today. But if you want additional time before filing that

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     amended complaint because you're in settlement negotiations,
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     I'm more than happy to extend the time for that purpose. Okay?
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               MR. FORD: Thank you, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: You're welcome.
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               MR. RUBENSTEIN: Thank you, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: All right. You all have a happy
 7
     holidays, if I don't speak to you between now and then.
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     Bye-bye.
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     (The hearing was concluded at 3:11 P.M.)
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1 CERTIFICATE 2 3 I, Stacy Harlow, Realtime Verbatim Reporter-Master; 4 Certified Verbatim Reporter-Master; Certificate of Merit; 5 Registered Broadcast Captioner; Registered CART Provider, and Official Reporter of the United States District Court for the 6 7 Northern District of West Virginia, do hereby certify that the 8 foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the proceedings had in the above-styled action on December 11, 2019, as 9 10 reported by me by stenomask. I certify that the transcript fees and format comply with 11 12 those prescribed by the Court and the Judicial Conference of 13 the United States. 14 Given under my hand this 29th day of April, 2020. 15 /s/Stacy Harlow 16 STACY HARLOW Official Reporter, United States 17 District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

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